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controls established by the Federation of Québec Maple 
Syrup Producers which has, since 1990, agreed with its 
members to hand over any surplus to ensure stability of 
supply and pricing. Some argue these quotas have spawned 
a black market leading to prohibition-style smuggling 
across borders, whereas the Federation defends its 
‘collective marketing’ system (FPAQ 2018; Hamilton 
2016; Skerritt 2016). This example highlights some of the 
tensions found within agri-food supply chains and systems, 
particularly those espousing norms, values and behaviours 
linked to the ‘moral economy of food’ (including, for 
example: an emphasis on food producers’ rights to secure 
livelihoods and fair pricing, and consumers’ demands for 
traceability and knowing where their food comes from) all 
of which are influenced by networks of power (Morgan 
2007, p. 167). The heist exposes the uneasy coexistence of 
collective marketing, the quest for pure and natural 
products, the realities of global marketplaces and consumer 
demands amidst the neo-liberal desires among (some) 
producers for higher profits. Although the iconography 
and imagery of the story of maple syrup production still 
heavily draws upon a nostalgic era of the small farm 
producer, these events suggest a powerful lobby which, in 
the wake of the heist, was branded by some rogue producers 
as a maple syrup ‘cartel’ or ‘mafia’ (Skerritt 2016).
How did things come this?
This heist and the illicit rogues involved with the theft, 
thrust Canada’s maple syrup industry into a limelight of 
sorts, or at least earned it a place among the humorous back 
pages featuring quirky offbeat stories, and even inspired a 
(yet to be produced) film starring Jason Segel (Hertz 2013). 
Entertainment factor aside, however, a closer analysis of the 
origin and trajectory of the maple syrup industry — which 
was at first a maple sugar industry — reveals how its 
producers’ collective and cooperative approach is deeply 
rooted in efforts to stave off threats from adulteration and 
US competitors, establish federal purity legislation and 
create an appetite for maple products in domestic markets. 
Historical data and analysis reveal a long tradition of 
collective and cooperative power among North American 
maple producers, including national and provincial groups 
within Canada many of whom committed to norms and 
values that aimed to protect both producer and consumer. 
These associations that were formed in the early twentieth 
century adopted the practice of collective marketing and 
espoused values and norms that aimed to improve 
producers’ outputs, profits and increase their leverage with 
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From August 2011 until July 2012, the Global Strategic 
Maple Syrup Reserve in Québec was the site of a major 
food crime, as thieves siphoned off 9600 barrels (3,000 
tonnes) of ‘liquid gold’ worth $18 million (CAD) for 
counterfeit sale across provincial and state borders, in what 
became known as the Great Maple Syrup Heist (Hamilton 
2016). Under cover of night, and thanks to securing access 
to some of the reserve’s key warehouses, the thieves 
replaced the syrup with water, volume-for-volume, which 
meant the switch was only discovered during an inspection 
many months later at one of the storage warehouses in 
Saint Louis de Blandford (Cohen 2016). In the end, three 
men were charged with hefty fines and prison sentences, 
most notably the ‘ring-leader’ Richard Vallières, who was 
sentenced to 8 years in prison and fined $9.4 million 
(Toronto Star, 2018).
Aside from the obvious sheer opportunism at play, the 
heist exposed a simmering war in the industry and has been 
characterized by some as a rebellious response to the quota 
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Between 1851–1890, yearly production of maple sugar 
in Canada was steadily increasing (from 13.5 million lbs to 
22.5 million lbs) but average yields began to decrease 
around the turn of the century and eventually dipped to 
less than 20 million lbs. As today, the bulk of production 
came from Québec (14.3 million lbs at the turn of the 
century), with lesser contributions from the neighbouring 
provinces of Ontario (5 million lbs), New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia (approximately 0.5 million lbs combined) 
(Spencer 1913, p.12).
This dip in production caused alarm among maple sugar 
producers. Like in many industries at the time, 
adulteration was rampant in maple sugar and syrup 
products. It was easy to mix maple sugar with products like 
beet and cane sugar, which undermined the profits of those 
who kept it pure, and in some instances, it caused many 
farmers to give up entirely as it was often more profitable to 
chop down trees and sell the maple wood instead (Lefebvre 
1916). Although some maple sugar aficionados believed 
consumer demand ‘should be higher’ (Grimm 1911) it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to compete with much 
cheaper cane sugar which had become more readily 
available and affordable globally as a regular household and 
dietary source of sweetness (Mintz 1986, p. 143).
Near the turn of the century, consumers still saw maple 
sugar and syrup as a special luxury item, or many would not 
have even heard of the product; it was not an everyday staple 
item for the average household. Pure maple sugar and syrup 
producers were undercut and undermined by fake cheaper 
adulterated blends, often marked by some design ‘suggestive 
of the Canadian emblem’ which would leave a bad taste in 
the mouths of consumers trying it for the first time (Spencer 
1913, p. 45). Those farmers who did have success on a small 
scale, would do so by producing a very high-quality product, 
building up a reputation through word-of-mouth and 
earning their profit through direct sale to consumers. Such 
farmers who had a good reputation would see prices in the 
range of $1.25 to $2.00 per gallon of syrup, and 12.5 to 30 
cents per pound of maple sugar (Spencer 1913, p.46).
The global sugar market had thus become quite 
competitive, and this crisis of production prompted 
Québec producers to look south for inspiration and to 
consider the benefits of collective power. ‘In Union is 
Strength’ were the opening words of A.A. Carleton, the 
head of the Vermont Maple Sugar Makers’ Association, in 
his 1913 address to an audience of Canadian producers 
contemplating their existence given the threats to the 
industry (Spencer 1913, p. 46). The Vermont group had 
existed for about 20 years prior, and was established for 
similar reasons, namely, that the industry was in decline 
due to the work of ‘mixers’ creating compound goods of 
lesser quality (Spencer 1913, p.54).
The Pure Maple Sugar and Syrup Co-Operative 
Agricultural Association was established in January 1913 
based in Waterloo, Québec, but open to producers in 
Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia as well. The 
the federal government. In this paper I trace the historical 
evolution of Canadian (primarily Québec) maple syrup 
production and marketing focusing on the early twentieth 
century cooperative organizations that preceded the 
Federation. I consider where power and agency sits - and 
has shifted - within this supply chain, taking into consideration 
the implications for both producers and consumers.
Cooperatives at the turn of the century
Just over 100 years before the heist, the Canadian and 
Québec maple syrup industry was having a crisis of a 
different sort. The industry was originally focused 
primarily on maple sugar — the grainy powdery desiccated 
result of boiling off all of the maple sap, rather than leaving 
some moisture in the product resulting in a syrup. 
Although maple sap, sugar and syrup were known products 
and processes for centuries before, the maple sugar industry 
coalesced into a viable entity and business for farmers in 
the middle of the 19th Century. New export markets had 
opened up overseas in Britain and France, and south of the 
border in the US demand continued at a steady level. 
Maple sugar’s solid cake-like block form, sometimes 
referred to as ‘maple concrete’, made for easy transport and 
shipping in (for eating) the form of ‘dainty two-ounce 
cakes, neatly packed’ or (for cooking) in ‘one and two-
pound bricks and in pails or tins of ten pounds’ (Perkins 
1910). It increasingly found its way into Europe as more 
agents and importers cropped up in port cities like 
Liverpool, and also made for a nostalgic treat for Canadian 
soldiers posted abroad during WWI (Lefebvre 1916). 
Maple syrup was lesser known, and also seen as a luxury 
item to send to well-to-do friends in one or five-gallon cans 
(Lynch 1910). Requests came from importers and agents in 
England to the Canadian Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
about the potential of developing a demand for it among 
English consumers (Watson 1898).
Maple syrup and sugar, both boiled down from the sap 
or ‘maple water’ that flows from the trees, can vary in 
supply each year depending upon the season and 
temperature of the spring thaw. This made for 
unpredictable yields depending on the season and climate 
which also affected production levels. During the spring 
harvest, trees are ‘tapped’ by boring a spout into the bark; 
the sap flows out and is collected in pails attached below. 
The pressure from the changing temperatures of the spring 
thaw, with cool nights and warm sunny days, causes sap to 
flow out of the tree, and drip steadily into the buckets. 
Buckets would be collected by farmers and poured into 
large barrels and transported by sled or horse-drawn sleigh 
to the sugar shack or sugar camp for processing. Once in 
the sugar shack, sap was poured into large ‘modern’ 
evaporators and boiled off at the right temperature to create 
syrup, or, sugar, and approximately 40 L of sap was needed 
to make one litre of maple syrup (Spencer 1913 pp.14–44).
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advantages to the working or ‘agricultural classes’ were 
emphasised: ‘In any section of the industrial world, when 
the success of the working classes was desired, the first thing 
was to unite in a body, and the latter then, championing all, 
would begin the struggle.’ (Lefebvre 1916).
Part of the struggle with maple products, then, was to 
improve output and stamp out adulteration. One strategy 
to meet these threats was to improve the quality of maple 
sugar and maple syrup by introducing grades and 
standards, and modernising equipment, as a way to protect 
both producer and consumer from the ‘speculator and 
middle man’ because as many advocates for pure maple 
sugar knew, pounds would magically get added to the 
product as it flowed into cities (Spencer 1913, p. 56).
Adulteration and purity 
The declining productivity of the maple syrup industry was 
very much linked to the ‘devilish’ and ‘evil’ problem of 
Association had two patrons, and, as an indication of how 
much support existed at both the federal and provincial 
levels: Honourable Martin Burrell (Canadian Minister of 
Agriculture) and the Honourable J. E. Caron, Minister of 
Agriculture for the Province of Québec. The honorary 
president post was held by Professor John F. Snell, a 
chemist from MacDonald College in Québec who had 
been conducting research on methods of analysis for 
samples of maple syrup (Snell 1920). The President was 
M.F. Goddard based in Waterloo; Vice-President was 
Chas. F. Fisk of Abbotsford, and the Directors included 
John H. Grimm of Montreal, R.T. Brownlee of Hemmingford, 
J.A. Dupuis of DesAulnais. The Secretary-Treasurer role 
was held by Joseph Lefebvre (Spencer 1913, p 52).
For the annual fee of $1.00, producers could obtain a 
membership. The Association established clear objectives 
which would attempt to place maple products on both the 
political, legislative and social agendas in Canada. First and 
foremost, they aimed to put pressure on the governments 
of Québec and Canada to change the existing laws to stop 
adulteration and the sale of compound syrups using cheaper 
and lower quality items which were falsely branded as ‘maple’. 
Canada’s first piece of anti-adulteration legislation emerged 
in 1874 (‘An Act to Impose License duties on Compounds of 
Spirits; to amend the Act respecting the Inland Revenue; and 
to prevent the adulteration of Food, Drink and Drugs’) and 
was modelled on English laws (Heick 1991, p. 11; Ostry 
2006, p 13). Although it had scope to make adulteration 
illegal for an array of products, it did not go far enough to 
define clear standards, grades or specifications for maple 
products. The association also wanted the government to 
assist in educating the so-called ‘agricultural classes’ in how 
to improve output and quality, and provide educational 
lectures, exhibitions and experimental stations to teach young 
people and consumers about maple sugar and syrup (Spencer 
1913, p. 52). Finally, they wanted the provincial and federal 
governments to help the members get markets both at home 
and abroad for their products (Spencer 1913, p. 52).
The Association strongly advocated the idea of 
‘Cooperative marketing’ (See Figure 1). In its first year, 
approximately 5,000 gallons of syrup and ‘a considerable 
amount of sugar’ was handled by the association, and 
‘satisfactory prices’ were obtained (Spencer 1913, p. 47). The 
aim was to do away with competition which drove prices 
down and put producers at a disadvantage. At that time in 
Canada, it was estimated that there were approximately 
55,000 sugar factories capable of making maple sugar or 
syrup but the association was concerned that it wasn’t 
meeting its potential, and there was money to be made 
(Lefebvre 1916, p. 20). It wished to ‘do the same for the 
[maple] sugar industry as for dairy and cattle breeding.’ 
(Lefebvre 1916.) In an impassioned speech at their 1916 
meeting the Member of Parliament for Vaudreuil, Gustave 
Boyer, reminded the assembly that ‘the essential condition 
for reaching the desired success quickly is the community: 
cooperation of goodwill and ideas’ (Lefebvre 1916). The 
Figure 1. Label authorised by the Maple Sugar and Syrup 
Cooperative Agricultural Association. (Source: Spencer, J.B. 
(1913). The Maple Sugar Industry in Canada. Bulletin No. 2B 
Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau. Library and Archives 
Canada. Ottawa.)
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powerful wholesalers, factories and retailers such as George 
Cary in Vermont, the Imperial Syrup Co. in Montreal, or 
The New England Maple Sugar Co. in Boston, or, the 
Québec Maple Sugar Producers’ Society established its first 
plant and warehouse in Plessisville (MacFarlane 1906). The 
advent of large bulk transport barrels made this possible; 
these could be loaded up at the farms’ sugar shacks and 
shipped by freight train to cities like Montreal or similar 
cities south of the border where wholesalers and retailers 
congregated. Although the barrels helped facilitate and 
create new market opportunities for producers, they also 
caused problems as these were uninspected and ungraded 
at both the point of collection and at the wholesalers, 
leaving much room for mislabelling or mixing of its 
contents. Producers and farmers committed to selling a 
pure product were being undermined; power had thus 
come to rest in the hands of the manufacturers and 
wholesalers, the ‘mixers’ as some cynically referred to these 
actors further along the maple product supply chains 
(Spencer 1913, p. 46).
The cooperatives fought back against this development. 
Drawing on its collective marketing and bargaining power, 
it sought to improve the overall quality, provide education 
and create standards. The Québec producers created its 
own set of grades for sugar: ‘Choice’, No. 1, No. 2 and No. 
3, each in increasing darkness and robust flavour. No. 2 
and 3 would be used for making sugar for baking or sent to 
the tobacco industry for mixing with cigarettes (Québec 
Maple Sugar Producers 1920, p. 10).
A powerful figure that emerged during this time was 
John Grimm, who, as mentioned above, was one of the five 
first Directors of the Pure Maple Sugar and Syrup Co-
operative Agricultural Association, and owner of Grimm 
Manufacturing in Montreal — a maker of industrial maple 
sugar and syrup processing equipment such as evaporators. 
In addition to passionately preaching against the existence 
of ‘bogus maple syrups and sugars’, improving quality and 
establishing grades, he was also a strong advocate for 
collective marketing of maple sugar and syrup (Grimm 
1911). In 1913 Grimm organized a maple sugar and syrup 
contest in Montreal and strongly lobbied the federal 
government for the need for greater legislation. (Spencer 
1913, p.57). The collective petitioned the federal 
government to establish an Act that would govern the 
maple syrup industry, and enshrine specifications and 
definitions of the word maple in the rule of law. Eventually, 
after consultation on a draft with people like Grimm, 
tobacco manufacturers (invested in the darker grade sugar 
for their products), the coops and retailers, the Maple Sugar 
Industry Act (and its regulations) came into force in 1931.
Strict specifications were to become enshrined in the 
Act. Overall, all grades of syrup had to weigh 13 lbs 2 
ounces per gallon and contain no more than 35 percent 
water. ‘Canada Fancy’ was very light amber or straw 
coloured with a characteristic maple flavour, free from any 
fermentation; ‘Canada Light’ was light amber and straw 
adulteration and concerns over product quality (Grimm 
1911). Although the nineteenth century heyday of 
adulteration was quelled somewhat by pure food laws in 
both the US (1906) and Canada (1874), it was still in 
fashion well into the twentieth century. Products which 
were not necessarily injurious to health, but still 
misleading, such as adding yellow to margarine to mask as 
butter (and thereby offering a cheaper alternative) 
paralleled some of the debates and concerns found among 
producers in the maple industry (Dupré 1999; Heick 1991). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, glucose could be had 
at less than two cents a pound, granulated sugar at four 
cents a pound, while syrup sold direct from producers at 
about one dollar per gallon. It was hard to argue against the 
cheaper alternative offered to consumers through 
compound or flavoured products, and with competing 
sweet options on the market such as glucose, molasses and 
cane sugar, one way to position maple sugar and syrup was 
that as a ‘luxury item’ for ‘discriminating customers’ 
(Spencer 1913, p 45). But as the Canadian Deputy Minister 
of Agriculture warned British enquirers about the state of 
Canadian maple products, it was ‘difficult for most of the 
manufacturers to withstand the temptation [to adulterate]’ 
(Parmelee 1898).
Maple sugar could be easily mixed with cheaper cane or 
beet sugar, or other powdery substances, such as chalk or 
Blanc d’Espagne, a calcium carbonate and clay powder 
mixture (Lefevbre, 1916). Maple syrup could be mixed 
with darker grades or water, or in some cases molasses 
(Grimm 1911). Some mixers created a compound using an 
alternative substance called ‘mapeleine’ (maple flavour) 
that, when one ounce was mixed with a gallon of molasses, 
produced a so-called ‘delicious syrup’ (Grimm 1911, p. 4). 
A series of investigations conducted by the Department of 
Inland Revenue’s Chief Dominion Analyst Thomas 
MacFarlane in 1906 and again in 1908 at the point of retail 
sale showed that the samples taken by inspectors found 
adulteration to be rampant. In 1906, of 85 maple syrups 
sampled from the four main provinces (but selling 
products originating and processed by manufacturers in 
both the US and Canada), only 22 were ‘genuine’, 2 
‘doubtful’, 8 had ‘declared adulteration’ on the label, and 
53 were found to be adulterated; of the 26 maple sugars, 
only 11 were found to be ‘genuine’ (MacFarlane 1906).
Inspection of samples was governed under the remit of 
the Adulteration Act. The cooperative, however, felt it 
didn’t go far enough to protect maple products, and the 
3200-strong membership petitioned the Minister of 
Agriculture to provide greater regulatory protection which 
would require analysts to confirm the sugar content of 
so-called ‘maple products’ (Grimm 1911, p. 20). The 
minister argued that it was too difficult to test but Grimm, 
one of the Coop’s directors, argued that at the 
manufacturing plants it was possible.
Producers were selling their product increasingly less 
and less direct to consumers and instead going through 
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maple product had been adulterated (Snell 1913, p. 740). It 
was tricky, however, and few analysts had training in these 
techniques and methods of detection as tests were still 
being developed by agricultural chemists. Moreover, 
inspectors were only learning about the differences in the 
new established grades. Part of the problem was also the 
point of inspection. As Grimm argued, testing at the site of 
production was not enough: it was a much better idea to 
test at the site of the wholesalers and retailers where mixing 
would be more likely to occur (Grimm 1929). The Minister 
of Agriculture assured Vaillaincourt of the Québec coop 
that he was working on finding ‘a capable research man’ 
(Grisdale, 1928).
Once again the Cooperation launched a powerful lobby 
to the Canadian federal government, in conjunction with 
equivalent organizations in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Québec and Ontario, petitioning for stricter controls on 
maple syrup purity and stricter fines for adulteration, 
better capacity for inspection and enforcement. This 
included the requesting graders for syrups produced by 
‘dealers’ (wholesalers) each spring in order to ‘protect both 
the farmer and purchasers’ (Vaillaincourt 1936). The 
federal government sent inspectors from their fruit branch 
to do surprise ‘bush inspections’, but many producers 
argued that more could be done at the packing, 
wholesaling and retail levels (Gardiner 1936). The 
cooperatives pushed for more: The New Brunswick Maple 
Sugar Producers Association passed a resolution requesting 
that the Act be revised to insist that 4 grades be mandatory 
on labels for inter-provincial trade; once Québec cooperatives 
got involved with the lobbying, the federal government 
responded with revisions to the Act (Clark 1936).
Meanwhile, as the Canadian industry headed toward 
stricter purity, grades and standards, south of the border 
Grimm’s equally vociferous counterpart, if not a foil in this 
maple syrup drama, was the wholesaler George Cary, of 
Cary Maple Sugar Company in Vermont. At the time the 
largest ‘dealer in the world’ and ‘preacher for purity’ Cary 
wrote to the Canadian Minister of Agriculture suggesting 
that Canadian farmers were in the ‘habit of cheating’ and 
insisted that there wasn’t a demand for the lighter grades 
among consumers (Cary 1928). He also criticized the 
‘attitude’ of the Cooperative in Québec and Plessisville for 
‘hurting’ the industry. The Cooperative had begun to also 
subsidize producers, which Cary said forced him to buy up 
cheap Canadian products (and re-sell these) just to remain 
competitive. Cary said that Canadian pure products were 
far ‘too cheap’ and even lobbied the House of 
Representatives in the US to raise the tariff on Canadian 
maple sugar to ten cents per pound, and on syrup to six 
cents per pound (Montreal Daily Star 1929).
The ‘preacher of purity’ was, somewhat ironically, 
caught up in litigation with Maine producers, and evidence 
showed he in fact supplied them with cane sugar so that 
they could adulterate their maple products (Payne 1928). 
In the wake of this threat from an American increase on 
coloured; ‘Canada medium’ was to be slightly darker amber 
or straw and finally, ‘Canada Dark’ was darker in colour 
than medium and (unlike the other 3 grades) trace 
fermentation or ‘sappiness’ flavour was permitted 
(Department of Agriculture 1931, Section 12). Sugar 
grades were also similarly defined and graded in the Act: all 
must consist of entirely solid or pulverised product 
resulting from the evaporation of maple sap or syrup and 
contain no more than 10% water, each with a designation 
of either ‘Canada Light’, ‘Canada Medium’ and ‘Canada 
Dark’. (Department of Agriculture 1931, Section 13 (1)).
Despite the Act in force as of 1931, the maple industry 
continued to be ‘menaced!’ as the Act wasn’t being properly 
enforced, and adulterated products continued to flow 
through the supply chains. Again, this caused more crisis, 
as an anonymous bulletin featuring Grimm’s visage 
prominently on the front page and seemingly aimed at 
consumers and producers screamed out headlines that 
‘55,000 Canadian farmers [were] being robbed of a real 
asset’ and it was the fault of the department of health for 
not inspecting and testing enough samples and enforcing 
the law (Maple Industry Is Menaced 1928). The 
anonymous author of this bulletin appeared to have great 
insider industry knowledge and connections to the point of 
even being able to have placed on one occasion a sample of 
adulterated maple sugar directly in the hands of the 
Minister of Health, a ‘black, grimy, rank to the taste…
dreadful apology for maple product.’ (Maple Industry is 
Menaced 1928). At the time the industry was valued at 
eight million dollars per annum; adulteration meant 
money was being lost, farmers and consumers were 
continuing to be ‘swindled’ and cheated and the whole 
industry was ‘undermined’ by adulteration (Maple 
Industry is Menaced 1928).
The Cooperatives called upon producers to lobby the 
government and MPs and demand that the regulations be 
enforced and more inspectors get trained up and sent out; 
they appealed to a sense of national unity and pride and 
that taking action meant to ‘be a builder-up, not a tearer-
down of Canada.’ (Maple Industry is Menaced 1928). Part 
of the problem was finding suitable inspectors. Many 
inspectors and analysts from the government Fruit Branch 
were enlisted, but few had the expertise in maple products 
to identify and test for real or fake products out in the field 
or the sugar groves. Tests had been developed thanks to a 
strong research program emanating from Montreal and 
McGill University into the science of maple products, but 
weren’t in widespread use. Testing for adulteration by cane 
or other sugars was tricky because the same constituent 
components found in granulated sugar was identical to the 
pure sugar components of maple syrup (Snell 1913, p. 740). 
Testing for other components unique to maple syrup such 
as malic acid as well as for alkaline values of ash (the 
remaining inorganic components once the organic parts 
have been burnt off), along with lead values, or the ‘lead 
test’ were some of the ways for an analyst to determine if a 
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involved telling the story of the 
production process, the maple 
groves, the flowing of the sap and 
the general romance of the sugar 
bush and maple harvesting season, 
especially the ‘sugaring off’ parties 
where the ‘amorous instincts of 
the budding youths’ might be 
awakened (Spencer 1913, p. 12; 
Vaillaincourt 1927, pp. 3–7). A 
nutrition and health angle was 
used to market maple products as 
being ‘pure’ sugar as opposed to 
the cheaper ‘refined’ cane sugar or 
molasses. Maple sugar and syrup 
was presented as being more 
calorific and hence of higher value 
with a total of 75 calories in one tablespoon, as opposed to 
63 calories in cane sugar or molasses, or 57.5 calories in 
corn syrup (Maple Sugar Producers of Québec 1920, p. 13). 
It was also marketed as a good source of iron which would 
be of benefit to ‘anaemic persons’ (Maple Sugar Producers 
of Québec 1920, p. 14).
maple duties, Grimm felt this was an opportunity for 
Canadian farmers to ‘clean up a little bit’ and make a 
quality of sugar ‘better than the class of sugar that Cary 
likes to ship to the US.’ (Grimm 1929). Grimm wrote to 
the federal minister of agriculture suggesting the need to 
‘help ourselves and help the farmer’ and ‘obtain a market 
for maple syrup and sugar at home.’ (Grimm 1929). 
Because of the problems outlined by Grimm, namely the 
lack of enforcement of the new maple industry regulations, 
the looming US tariff rise and inevitable drop in exports, 
the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Minister agreed 
that something had to be done to avert another maple 
industry crisis; Martin urged that it was time that ‘we must 
foster the sale of the pure product among our own people’ 
(Martin 1929). As one producer put it, ‘it has been 
suggested that we advertise in England, why not work our 
own country first?’ (Jenne 1928).
Marketing of maple products 
By the mid-1930s, with the legislative clout of the new 
maple sugar act, the Québec producers lobbied the 
Canadian federal department of Agriculture as well as the 
department of trade to help with the marketing of products 
both at home and abroad. The harvest in 1934 and 1935 
was particularly heavy and producers were ‘flooded’ in 
syrup (Pryce 1935). Having taken the stand for purity 
against their American counterparts, Canadian producers 
with the support of the federal government, embarked 
upon an ambitious advertising campaign to promote maple 
syrup and sugar products to domestic audiences. There 
were still calls for finding markets in the US and well as 
overseas in the United Kingdom, however the more expensive 
cost of Canadian sugar put British consumers off (Skinner 1935).
The marketing of maple syrup began in earnest in the 
1920s, led predominantly by the large collective of Québec 
Maple Sugar Producers’ Society, but with support from 
their provincial and national counterparts. The messaging 
Figure 2. Windsor Station Room 351 Maple Syrup Marketing c. 1935. (Source: 
Library and Archives Canada, Department of Agriculture. RG 20 Vol. 311. Ottawa.)
Figure 3. ‘The Safe Sweet for Children!’ c. 1935. (Source: Library 
and Archives Canada. Department of Agriculture, 
RG 20 Vol. 311. Ottawa.)
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twentieth century? Although a smaller heist occurred in 
2016, the FPAQ has recently confirmed that the quota 
system is being revisited to improve benefits for producers, 
and it is looking to expand production by adding five 
million taps after a record season in 2017 (FPAQ, 2018).
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